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Should Technology be Trusted?
The Detrimental Role of Video
Footage in a Qualified Immunity
Analysis *
I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Sureshbhai Patel, an Indian grandfather, experienced a
traumatic encounter with law enforcement while walking peacefully in
his neighborhood.1 During the encounter, the officer used excessive
force and rendered Patel forever partially paralyzed.2 Confident in the
fact that two dashboard cameras equipped with audio and video
capabilities captured the incident, Patel introduced the footage to the
court. Despite overcoming qualified immunity on summary judgment,
Patel’s hopes that the footage would provide clear and accurate imaging
of the incident quickly faded away. Whether using a body camera,
dashboard camera, bystander cell phone, or an affixed video
surveillance camera, these devices are intended to provide safety and
protection, but they are falling short of their call. Rather than clarifying
these incidents, cameras, especially those of subpar quality, are proving
to be a hindrance in qualified immunity cases.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has
addressed qualified immunity countless times, but the increased use of
camera footage has made overcoming a qualified immunity defense a
greater challenge. With video footage highlighting minute-by-minute
detail, finding a factually similar case, a critical step in a qualified

* A special thanks to Dean Daisy Floyd who has guided me since the beginning of my
law school journey and provided me with sound advice and insight in completing my
Casenote. My heartfelt gratitude to Sandhya and Harshad Shah, my parents, and
Mahadev and Ansuya Desai, my grandparents, for always being present, pushing for
tenacity, and providing unconditional love and support. Thank you to my mentors,
friends, and classmates who have shared their words of advice and encouragement.
1 Patel v. City of Madison, Alabama, 959 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2020).
2 Id. at 1335.
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immunity analysis, becomes more like a needle in a haystack, should
the needle even exist. Similarly, evaluating whether an officer’s actions
clearly and obviously violated a constitutionally protected right is
increasingly difficult when the blurred actions of the figure in the video
footage is far from indicative. The notion that cameras will help offer
protection to those relying on them is quickly fading and its application
in legal analysis is suboptimal as applied to a qualified immunity
analysis.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Sureshbhai Patel, a fifty-seven-year-old Indian national, had
recently retired as a farmer in his native home, Gujarat, India. Despite
knowing little to no English, Patel relocated overseas to reside with his
son in Madison, Alabama. Patel had been living in the United States for
only one week when one encounter with the police altered his life
forever. 3
Upon arriving in the United States, Patel frequently walked in his
neighborhood. On the morning of February 6, 2015, Patel left the house
wearing a light-colored sweater, jeans, and a toboggan hat and
commenced his usual neighborhood stroll. One neighbor, who was
unfamiliar with the new Indian resident, called the Police Department
and reported that a “black man” in his thirties“[was] walking . . . close
to the garage,” and urged the dispatcher to send “somebody to talk to
the unidentified man.” Officer Parker responded to the “check subject
call” along with his partner Officer Slaughter, who was still undergoing
training. 4
When the officers arrived at the scene, they spotted Patel walking on
the sidewalk but simultaneously noticed Patel was neither black nor in
his thirties. The officers parked the police cruiser behind Patel and
turned on the dashboard camera which was equipped with both audio
and video capabilities. Parker and Slaughter exited the vehicle and
immediately called after Patel, asking him to “come here” and inquired
“what’s going on?” Patel walked towards the officers and said,
“India . . . no English . . . my house, my house, 148, walking, India,”
while simultaneously pointing in the direction he was heading.
Slaughter responded, “I can’t understand you . . . where is your
address . . . where do you live . . . stop walking. Stop walking.”5

Id. at 1333.
Id.
5 Id. at 1334.
3
4
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The officers believed that Patel kept suspiciously reaching into his
pockets during the encounter. As a result, they took hold of Patel’s
hands and forced them together behind his back. Patel testified that he
did not move while Parker had his hands restrained and that Parker
frisked both of Patel’s pockets. In contrast, Parker testified that Patel
pulled his left-hand free four times during the pocket search, rendering
Parker unable to complete frisking one of the pockets. Parker claimed
that Patel “stepped forward, turned his head toward the officers, and
moved his shoulder . . . .” In response, Parker barked loudly, “[d]o not
jerk away from me again. If you do, I am going to put you on the
ground . . . do you understand what I am saying to you?”6
Parker immediately attempted to pat down Patel’s left pant pocket
again. As Parker began, Patel allegedly took a step forward and turned
his head. Parker reacted by using his leg to sweep Patel’s left leg out
from under him. Patel’s leg flew back behind him with such force, it
caused his shoe to fly off. Parker continued to hold Patel’s hands behind
Patel’s back as he performed the takedown maneuver. Patel hit the
ground without the use of his hands to arrest his fall and struck the
ground with his face and left shoulder. Parker admitted he did not
know how to properly perform a leg sweep. 7
Officer Spence, another Madison County Officer, had responded to
the scene at some point during the altercation. Spence parked his car
and activated his dashboard camera before the takedown had occurred.
This second dashboard camera captured a video of the incident from an
opposing angle to that of the responding officers’ dashboard camera.
Spence testified that Patel, “appeared to be in his 70s.” He also testified
that he witnessed Parker, the responding officer, get on his hands and
knees on top of Patel, after the takedown, and yell, “stop trying to jerk
away from me.” However, Patel was unresponsive. One of the officers
then said to Spence, “he don’t speak a lick of English.” Spence testified
that when he arrived on the scene before the takedown, he did not
witness anything that would have caused him to “lay hands
on . . . Patel.” 8
Patel was hospitalized as a result of the violent takedown, and he
was rendered permanently partially paralyzed. Patel filed a civil
lawsuit against Parker and the City of Madison under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for “illegal seizure, unlawful search, and excessive force in violation of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Id. at 1335.
Id.
8 Id. at 1334–35.
6
7
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Constitution.”9 Patel argued that the footage from both dashboard
cameras showed that he did not resist before Parker conducted the
takedown maneuver.10 Patel filed for summary judgment. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied
Patel’s motion. 11
Parker argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity from all of
Patel’s claims because he was acting within the scope of his duty. The
district court denied Parker qualified immunity on Patel’s excessive
force claims under the Fourth Amendment because several disputed
issues of fact remained. Parker filed an appeal on the district court’s
denial of summary judgment. On appeal, The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied a de novo standard of review,
affording no deference to the lower court’s decision. The Court ruled
that the dashboard video camera recordings were inconclusive and that
they were unable to resolve the factual discrepancies between the
parties.12 The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of summary
judgment to Parker.13
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. What is Qualified Immunity?
Qualified immunity is a legal defense that shields public officers and
government officials from liability for civil damages for violations
committed during the course and scope of their official role.14 The
protection offered to these officials is limited “insofar as their conduct
does not violate [a] clearly established statutory or constitutional right
of which a reasonable person would have known.”15 The purpose of this
legal defense is to shield officials from “harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”16 As a result,
courts consider whether the official’s actions, at the time of the
violation, were taken either pursuant to the performance of their duties,

9 Id. Patel also asserted claims under Alabama law which will not be considered for
this Casenote.
10 Id. at 1336.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 1332.
13 Id. at 1333.
14 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).
15 Id. at 818.
16 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (emphasis added).
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or within the scope of their authority.17 In the case of police officers, the
law recognizes that an officer’s job may sometimes be dangerous and
must often depend on snap judgements which can result in the
difference between life and death.18 As a result, the qualified immunity
defense allows them to work without the fear of liability, while still
holding accountable those who plainly or knowingly violate the law.19
In order to overcome an official’s qualified immunity defense, the
plaintiff must show (1) the official’s conduct violated a constitutionally
protected right, and (2) that right had been clearly established at the
time of the misconduct such that the official had fair notice that their
actions violated another’s rights.20 Before an official loses the
protections of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must satisfy both prongs
of the test.21
B. Overcoming Qualified Immunity: The Two Prong Analysis
1.
The Official’s Conduct Violated a Constitutionally
Protected Right
Graham v. Connor,22 states that an analysis of the first prong begins
by identifying “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.”23 A
typical qualified immunity analysis may consider rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.24 The Fourteenth Amendment
guards against the use of excessive force against arrestees and pretrial
detainees.25 The Fourth Amendment governs, “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”26 In considering only the Fourth

17 Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d
1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988)).
18 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989).
19 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
20 Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at
232; Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010)); see also Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
21 Melton, 841 F.3d at 1221; Grider, 618 F.3d at 1254 (the court may consider the
prongs in either order).
22 490 U.S. 386.
23 Id. at 394.
24 Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019).
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1313 (citing J.W. v.
Birmingham Bd. Of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2018)).
26 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Amendment, the alleged violation is evaluated using a “reasonable
standard test.”27
a. The Fourth Amendment Reasonable Standard Test
A reasonable standard test weighs the defendant’s right to be free
from excessive force against the government’s rationale for using the
excessive force.28 In examining the defendant’s right, the court asks
whether the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable considering the
defendant’s actions and the specific circumstances surrounding the
incident.29 In examining the government’s rationale, the court asks
what a reasonable officer would do under similar circumstances.30
“Reasonableness” must be determined from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene and not by using the “20/20 vision of
hindsight.”31
b. Acceptable Use of Force Under the Fourth Amendment
Not every push or shove violates the Fourth Amendment.32 It is
reasonable for an officer to use some degree of force, “physical
coercion[,] or [a] threat.”33 Courts give great deference to an officer’s
judgement due to the uncertain and evolving circumstances ever
prevalent in their roles.34 In addition, courts do not consider an officer’s
mental intentions when evaluating a potential violation.35 Courts only
evaluate the officer’s actions.36 If an officer conducts themselves with
malicious or evil intent but their actions are reasonable, there is no
Fourth Amendment violation.37 In contrast, an officer’s good intentions
will not protect them should their actions constitute an unreasonable
use of force.38
In determining whether an officer’s actions are unreasonable, the
Supreme Court has identified six key factors to weigh in a balancing
test: (1) the severity of the crime, (2) whether the individual posed a
threat to the officers on the scene or others, (3) whether the individual
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
Id. at 396.
29 Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2002).
30 Graham, 490 U.S. at 387.
31 Id. at 396.
32 Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir. 1973)).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 397 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
36 Id.
37 Id. (citing Scott, 436 U.S. at 138).
38 Id. (citing Scott, 436 U.S. at 138).
27
28

2021

SHOULD TECHNOLOGY BE TRUSTED

983

resisted or evaded arrest, (4) the need for force to be applied, (5) the
amount and type of force applied in light of the need, and (6) the
severity of the injury.39
2.
The Constitutional Right has been Clearly Established at
the Time of the Incident
In addition to showing a violation of a constitutionally protected
right, the plaintiff must also show that the constitutional right was
“clearly established” at the time of the incident.40 Determining whether
a right was clearly established rests upon evaluating whether the
official had “fair warning” that their conduct violated the Fourth
Amendment.41 A law enforcement officer has had fair warning if the
case law is readily apparent to all government officials such that they
know or should have known that their actions violate federal law.42
However, an “official’s awareness of the existence of an abstract
right . . . does not equate to knowledge that his conduct infringes the
right.”43 As a result, the unlawfulness should be obvious and based on
“materially similar” cases.44
a. Fair Warning
A plaintiff may show that the law gives officials fair warning of a
clearly established right in three ways.45 First, the plaintiff can point to
a substantially similar case in which the force was unlawful.46 In
applying this first method, a case-by-case comparison is required
because judicial precedent is tied to particularized facts.47 For example,
in cases where an officer treats an obedient, under control, and
unresisting suspect with excessive and brute force, the Eleventh Circuit
has repeatedly held that the officer has clearly violated the Fourth
Amendment and will be denied qualified immunity.48 In Stephens v.
DeGiovanni, the Eleventh Circuit denied an officer qualified immunity
when he inflicted forceful blows to the chest and threw the compliant
See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see also Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1197–98 (2002).
Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida, 208 F.3d 919, 925 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
41 Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting McClish v. Nugent,
483 F.3d 1231, 1248 (11th Cir. 2007)).
42 Coffin, 642 F.3d at 1013 (citing Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1350).
43 Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Coffin, 642 F.3d at 1015 (emphasis added)).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 See Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2017).
39
40
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defendant against the car door.49 In Slicker v. Jackson,50 the Eleventh
Circuit denied an officer qualified immunity when he kicked the ribs of
a handcuffed and non-resisting defendant and subsequently beat his
head on the ground.51 Courts have reevaluated Slicker and clarified
that a defendant does not need to be in handcuffs in order to be
considered “under control.”52 In Lee v. Ferraro, the Eleventh Circuit
denied an officer qualified immunity when he slammed the head of a
handcuffed and non-violent defendant onto the hood of the car.53 In
reaching its conclusion in each of these cases, the court compared the
amount of force used by the officer and the actions of the defendant
leading up to the use of the excessive force.54
Second, the plaintiff can show that a broader, clearly established
principle, should control the novel facts of the case.55 The principle must
be established with obvious clarity such that the official would instantly
know their actions violated a constitutional right.56 Third, the plaintiff
can show that the actions of the officer “so obviously violate[d] the
constitution that prior case law is unnecessary.”57 The distinction
between the last two is narrow but it is unnecessary to untangle when
the focus remains on the first of the three showings. Typically, if case
law has not paved a bright line rule on similar facts, qualified immunity
will often protect the defendant.58

Id. at 1326.
215 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000).
51 Id. at 1233.
52 Stephens, 852 F.3d at 1326 n.33 (the court also held that a defendant will not be
deprived of pursuing an excessive force claim simply because they escaped without
serious injury).
53 Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198.
54 Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1269 (11th Cir. 2014) (the court compared the
defendant’s lifting of their head off of the hot pavement to the officer’s action of slamming
their head back down onto the pavement. In reaching its conclusion, the court considered
that the defendant held their head off of the ground for long periods of time and made no
sudden head jerks which could be perceived as a threat. Ultimately, they ruled that the
minor transgressions or deviations from the officer’s order was not sufficient to warrant
the use of excessive force in this case).
55 Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005).
56 Priester, 208 F.3d at 926 (obvious clarity is when an official’s conduct is so obviously
a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the violation should be readily apparent to the
official).
57 Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Mercado, 407 F.3d at 1159).
58 Id.
49
50
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C. A New Approach to Qualified Immunity: The Introduction of Camera
Footage
The introduction of camera footage has changed the way courts
approach fact finding and has altered the amount of deference given to
either the plaintiff or defendant.59 In Scott v. Harris, Officer Scott
attempted to stop Harris for speeding, but Harris began evading the
officer and commenced a dangerous car chase. During the chase, the
officer used a common police technique that causes a fleeing vehicle to
spin to a stop. The maneuver caused Harris’ car to run down an
embankment, overturn, crash, and rendered him a quadriplegic. Harris
brought a claim for excessive force and claimed that before the police
intervention he was driving normally, slowed for curves on the road,
used his indicator for turns, and that he did not run any motorists off
the road. Officer Scott raised the qualified immunity defense. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, while
accepting Harris’ version of events, rejected Officer Scott’s motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Officer Scott appealed
to the United States Supreme Court.60 In conducting its analysis, the
Supreme Court examined the available dashboard camera footage.61
The footage showed Harris swerving around more than a dozen cars,
crossing the double yellow lines, forcing cars to take refuge on the
shoulder of the road, and running through multiple red lights.62 The
court rejected normal procedure because of the clear and convincing
videotape evidence.
In that case, the Supreme Court concluded that the lower courts
should have “viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.”63
In doing so, the court was almost able to bypass the qualified immunity
analysis by stating that the substantially similar cases raised by the
plaintiff could be easily dismissed due to the vastly different facts
apparent from the camera footage.64 The court concluded that the
officer’s conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment because video
footage demonstrates as much.65 The court did not reach the
constitutional question and did not complete the qualified immunity
analysis it would have undertaken but for the video footage.
See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
Id. at 374–76, 379.
61 Id. at 378.
62 Id. at 379–80.
63 Id. at 380–81.
64 Id. at 384.
65 Id. at 387 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
59
60
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While video footage more often than not falls far below the quality
and clarity of the footage in Scott, courts continue to use video footage
during a qualified immunity analysis. In a recent video footage case, the
United States District Court for the Tenth Circuit found that, “[d]ue to
the lack of contrast between [the plaintiff’s] shirt, the pavement, and
the car door,” it is difficult to discern what occurred.66 In shifting to
whether the constitutional right was clearly established, the court ruled
that “[t]he video evidence at issue . . . presents no analogue,” to any
other case.67 As a result, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the clearly
established law and the defendant was entitled to immunity.68 Many
courts have followed this trend of viewing and evaluating facts in the
light most favorable to either the video footage or the Plaintiff,69 and
are using the footage as an indicator for obvious clarity and factual
similarities.70
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
In Patel v. City of Madison, Alabama, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, through a unanimous opinion written
by Justice Rosenbaum, revisited the application of qualified immunity
and applied it to a nuanced set of facts involving opposing testimonies
between the parties and two sets of dashboard cameras.71 The court
concluded that the dashboard video camera recordings were
inconclusive and that they did not help resolve the factual discrepancies
between the parties.72 The court affirmed the district court’s denial of
summary judgment to Parker.73 In reaching this conclusion, the court
conducted a full qualified immunity analysis.
To begin its analysis, the court looked at whether Parker was acting
within the scope of his duties when the incident occurred. The court
looked at whether Parker’s actions were taken (1) pursuant to the
performance of his duties, or (2) were within the scope of his

Kapinski v. City of Albuquerque, 964 F.3d 900, 907 (10th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 912.
68 Id.
69 Cunningham v. Shelby County, 218-CV-02185, 2020 WL 1609508, at *21(W.D. Tenn.
Apr. 1, 2020).
70 See generally Cunningham v. City of Chicago, No. 17C5070, 2020 WL 1503580, at
*9–10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2020); Boothe v. Wheeling Police Officer Sherman (Star #155),
190 F. Supp. 3d 788, 799 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
71 Patel, 959 F.3d at 1332.
72 Id. at 1333.
73 Id.
66
67
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authority.74 Here, Parker responded to the scene after a “check subject
call” was issued from the dispatcher.75 Without a clear indication of
which actions are required under a check subject call, Parker’s
interaction with Patel seemed to fall within his duty to conduct
investigative functions.76 As a result, Parker’s actions were pursuant to
the performance of his duties.77
Once Parker made a successful showing that his actions were a part
of his official duty, the burden shifted to Patel to prove that the defense
of qualified immunity was inappropriate under the circumstances.78 In
doing so, Patel had to overcome both prongs of the test by showing (1)
Parker violated Patel’s constitutional right to be free from excessive
force, and (2) Patel’s right was clearly established at the time of
Parker’s actions.79
In evaluating the first prong, whether Parker violated Patel’s right to
be free from excessive force, the court construed the facts in a light most
favorable to Patel.80 The court concluded that Patel was not resisting
arrest in the moments leading up to and including the time of the
excessive forceful leg sweep. In reviewing the dashboard video, Justice
Rosenbaum penned that Patel’s hands were visible and moved at his
midsection, not suspiciously in or around his pockets as Parker
claimed.81 The court reasoned that the jury would also likely find that
Patel never engaged in suspicious activity, his greatest crime was
merely walking down the sidewalk. 82
In its deliberation, the court also considered that the officers were
aware and acknowledged that Patel did not speak nor understand much
English.83 The court concluded that the officers could not have
reasonably anticipated Patel to follow their orders exactly.84 In
considering the video footage again, the court admitted that any
evidence of Patel forcibly wrenching his hands out of Parker’s grip is
indistinguishable from other movements.85 Since Patel’s alleged
wrenching of the hands out of Parker’s grip was unremarkable, it is
Jordan, 38 F.3d at 1566.
Patel, 959 F.3d at 1333.
76 Id. at 1338.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1339.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1335.
74
75
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clear that it was not done with the force and aggression painted by
Parker’s testimony. The video showed Parker was successfully able to
frisk Patel’s right pant leg from the pocket to the shoe once Patel’s
hands were restrained behind his back. As Parker attempted to pat
Patel’s left pant leg, the video footage shows Patel made a movement
with his leg. The court remarked that it is unlikely that the movement
was a step as Parker alleges.86 Instead, the court concluded that the
footage revealed that Patel adjusted his foot at most one inch to the side
in an effort to maintain his balance. The court reasoned that because
Patel had not resisted, Parker had no reason to use excessive force.87
Parker argued that the movements together—Patel’s minor foot
adjustment and the turning of his head—could be perceived as
resistance. However, the court outright denied this and listed prior
precedent that clearly states that the presence of minor transgressions
by the defendant does not open the doors to excessive force nor qualified
immunity.88 The court thoroughly analyzed the video by slowing the
footage to quarter-speed.89 By viewing Patel’s movements in exhaustive
detail, the court held that Patel turned his head halfway in response to
Officer Spence’s arrival at the scene.90 The court did not explicitly
convey how they interpreted this visual, but from the context of the
opinion, it is clear that the court treated this as they did the minor foot
movement, as a natural reaction and hardly a show of force, retaliation,
or fleeing.
The court concluded in its first prong that Parker violated Patel’s
constitutional right to be free from excessive force as Patel’s minor
movements did not warrant and were not proportionate to the
takedown.91 The court acknowledged two main issues with the video
footage, (1) the footage from one camera is blocked by the positioning of
the officers,92 and (2) the footage from the second camera is grainy and
distant.93 Ultimately, the court concluded that (1) Patel was not
resisting Parker’s orders, (2) Patel was seriously and permanently
injured, and (3) the force of Parker’s leg sweep, all culminated in a
violation of Patel’s right to be free from excessive force.94

Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1339–40.
88 Id. at 1340.
89 Id. at 1335.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1336.
92 Id. at 1334.
93 Id. at 1334–35.
94 Id. at 1342.
86
87
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In evaluating the second prong, whether a law had clearly
established that Parker’s force was unconstitutional, Patel showed that
a broader principle should control the facts of the case, and that this
was a case of obvious clarity.95 The court reasoned that Parker knew or
should have known that he was violating Patel’s rights when he threw
Patel to the ground.96 The court concluded that no reasonable officer
would have swept Patel’s legs out from underneath him because Patel
was frail, he was not resisting, and he was not attempting to flee.97 As a
result, the law clearly forbade Parker’s actions.98 This conclusion adds
significant weight to Officer Spence’s testimony when he stated that he
did not witness anything that would have caused him to “lay hands
on…Patel.”99
After conducting a full qualified immunity analysis, the court
rendered summary judgment inappropriate because three factual
disputes remained.100 First, whether Patel jerked his hands free from
Parker. Second, whether Patel’s actions prevented Parker from
handcuffing Patel. Third, whether Parker had finished his frisk before
leg sweeping Patel. If a jury were to decide these questions in Patel’s
favor, Patel’s right to be free from excessive force would be clearly
established. For these reasons, the court denied summary judgment to
Parker.101
V . IMPLICATIONS
Technology is driving a wedge between traditional legal analysis and
the need to modernize, adapt, and adopt. Decades of jurisprudence
holds that in a qualified immunity analysis, the “clearly established
law” must be particularized to the facts of the case or established by
obvious clarity. For many plaintiffs, presenting factually similar cases
is already a difficult task because of the unique circumstances
surrounding each incident of excessive force. However, with technology
highlighting those differences in stark detail, the task will become
almost impossible. The Supreme Court has insisted that exact factual
similarities or a case on point is not necessary. However, they equally
insist that “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or

Id. at 1342–43.
Id. at 1343.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1344.
99 Id. at 1335.
100 Id. at 1336.
101 Id. at 1331.
95
96
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constitutional question beyond debate.”102 The juxtaposition of
standards creates an impossible task for the plaintiff and makes
overcoming the qualified immunity defense exceedingly difficult.
Patel argued that the law against excessive force in his case was
clearly established due to obvious clarity rather than through factually
similar cases. Showing obvious clarity using video footage that is
grainy, distant, and unclear, is a difficult task. However, in Patel’s case
perhaps it was a strategic move as the presence of the video footage
practically eliminates the ability to draw factual similarities. In most
cases, video footage and cameras are not likely to be a sufficient
solution to solve the problem of qualified immunity. In theory, the
presence and use of dashboard and body cameras would be extremely
valuable as they provide an unfiltered and unedited version of the
events. However, in reality, cameras are making it impossible to
analogize cases. In the case of low-resolution cameras, their use only
further compounds factual discrepancies.
With the availability of a visual record, every action or reaction is
another basis upon which cases can be distinguished. While some of
these minor differences are immaterial when introduced through
witness testimony, cameras do not allow a detail to go unnoticed. Video
footage has the ability to distort the image, introduce distracting
peripheral images, and change the perspective.103 Even unmanned
cameras see, frame, and distort the images they capture. When viewers
see images produced by the cameras, the layers of visual interpretation
are magnified. There is rarely enough time to draw a viewer’s attention
to the angle or context of the footage let alone point out the implicit
biases each viewer imposes upon the images that they see.
The use of video footage has interrupted time-honored legal
procedure. For example, the purpose of a jury is to observe demeanor
and hear witness testimony with pauses and intonation. Justice
Stevens, writing for the dissent in Scott v. Harris, claimed that allowing
a videotape to speak for itself usurped the function of the jury.104 What
the court in Scott failed to consider when making its decision is that
videos rarely accurately and completely capture the events as they did
in that particular case. Fortunately, courts subsequent to Scott have
treated it as an exception to the rule. Similarly, the digital nature of
video footage has given courts the power to view detailed breakdowns of
the video sequence, potentially violating the legal tests courts seek to
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
Naomi Mezey, The Image Cannot Speak for Itself: Film, Summary Judgment, and
Visual Literacy, 48 Val. U. L. Rev. 1 (2013).
104 Scott, 550 U.S. at 397 (Stevens J., dissenting).
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apply. For example, a frame-by-frame analysis of the incident in
question could potentially infringe on the court’s attempts to avoid
using 20/20 hindsight when reviewing footage.105 Viewing each
movement, facial expression, or peripheral factor in micro-moments
provides the court with detailed information that the parties
themselves potentially did not know or realize at the time of the
incident.
While video cameras help place judges and jurors in the shoes of both
the plaintiff and the defendant, we are trusting these tools in place of
the testimony of the parties. This is leading to a breakdown of legal
principles and societal goals. Principles such as honesty, integrity, and
justice for all are notions important to every community and
neighborhood around the country and usage of video footage in the
court room seems to undermine the trust we should have in our fellow
citizens. Our hope that government-issued dashboard cameras or body
cameras will help clarify altercations remains unfounded as
demonstrated in Patel’s case.
The good intentions with which the use of cameras became common
place has been doing more harm than good. United States Supreme
Court Justice, Sonia Sotomayor, has often shared her concerns that the
court is developing a “disturbing trend” because it has “not hesitated to
summarily reverse courts for wrongly denying officers the protection of
qualified immunity in cases involving the use of force . . . [b]ut [it]
rarely intervene[s] when courts wrongly afford officers the benefit of
qualified immunity in these same cases.”106 In addition, originalists, the
late Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, and sitting Justice Clarence
Thomas, believe qualified immunity is a legislative task ill-suited for
the court.107 An unchecked and irreversible granting of qualified
immunity is on the horizon should courts continue to substitute legal
analysis in lieu of video footage. For each case where drawing factual

See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Robert Barnes, Sotomayor Sees “disturbing trend” of Unequal Treatment Regarding
Police,
Alleged
Victims,
Washington
Post
(Apr.
24,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ courts_law/sotomayor-sees-disturbing-trend-ofunequal-treatment-regarding-police-alleged-victims/2017/04/24/dfe8c368-2912-11e7-b60533413c691853_story.html?noredirect=on.
107 See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611–12 (1998) (Scalia J.,
dissenting)
(Justice Scalia comments that the crafting of the qualified immunity doctrine that “we
have invented,” is an “essentially legislative activity,” which overshadows the
“appl[ication] of common law embodied in the [Constitution]”); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (Justice Thomas urges the
court to reconsider the qualified immunity doctrine because it advances the court’s policy
preferences rather than “the mandates of Congress”).
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similarities becomes an unreachable bar or where obvious clarity is
obfuscated by the images themselves, courts will continue to grant
qualified immunity at an alarming and potentially unwarranted rate.
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